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BODY MODIFICATION AND
ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING:
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
ALICIA OUELLETTE*

The observation that adolescence is a time of experimentation and selfexpression is neither surprising nor troubling. Nonetheless, a parent facing a
sixteen-year-old with a new tongue ring, an oozing tattoo, or an unrelenting desire
for breast augmentation might well be both troubled and surprised by today's
version of youth experimentation. Although precise statistics are not available, the
evidence suggests that body modification, whether through cosmetic surgery,
Botox injections, body piercing, or tattooing, is very much a part of youth culture in
the United States today.' Anecdotal reports of "the graduation boob job"2 and
mother-daughter cosmetic surgery3 are regular fodder on cable television. In some
communities, rhinoplasty (the so-called "nose job") and belly button piercings are
practically a rite of passage. 4 Indeed, the American Society of Plastic Surgeons
reports that in 2010, "nearly 219,000 cosmetic plastic surgery procedures were
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1. See Laurie E. Scudder, Teens and Body Art-Into the Mainstream, MEDSCAPE NURSES (Feb. 5,
2007), http://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/551430 (discussing the increased prevalence of body
modification among adolescents).
2. See, e.g., 20/20: Why are Parents Buying Their Girls the Gift of Surgery? (ABC News
television broadcast June 24, 2005), available at http://abcnews.go.com/2020/story?id=875821
(reporting on the phenomena of parents paying for the breast augmentation surgery of their teenagers).
3. See, e.g., The Real Housewives of Orange County: Friends, Enemies, and Husbands (BRAVO
television broadcast Nov. 12, 2009), available at http://www.bravotv.com/the-real-housewives-oforange-county/videos/mother-daughter-cosmetic-surgery (showing a mother and daughter getting their
plastic surgery consultation together); Diane Mapes, Mom-Daughter Duos Go Under Knife, MSNBC
(May 7, 2010, 8:25 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36993283/ns/health-skin-and beauty/t/momdaughter-duos-go-under-knife/#.TplmTpzEnF4 (recounting stories from plastic surgeons who believe
that mother-daughter plastic surgery is becoming more popular).
4. For a historical account of cosmetic surgery, see generally ELIZABETH HAIKEN, VENUS ENvY:
A HISTORY OF COSMETIC SURGERY (1997); KATHY DAVIS, DUBIOUS EQUALITIES & EMBODIED
DIFFERENCES: CULTURAL STUDIES ON COSMETIC SURGERY (2003). For a more modem perspective on
the use of cosmetic surgery on teenagers, see generally FREDERICK N. LUKASH, THE SAFE AND SANE
GUIDE To TEENAGE PLASTIC SURGERY (Debbie Harmsen ed., 2010).
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performed" on adolescents between the ages of thirteen and nineteen.5 Other
reports state that Botox was injected into Americans between the ages of thirteen
and nineteen nearly 12,000 times in 2008,6 and that forty percent of "millennials"
(the generation that is now between the ages of eighteen and twenty-eight) have
tattoos and twenty-five percent have piercings other than ear piercings.7 A different
study found that twenty-four percent of teenagers have tattoosY
Despite the prevalence of body modification in the adolescent population,
legal literature has paid scant attention to the topic. 9 In contrast, there is a strong
trend in the legal literature advocating for increased decision-making rights among
adolescents in the medical context.10 Superficially at least, the argument for
increased decision-making rights supports increased choice for adolescents for
cosmetic medical interventions as well. On closer examination though, caution is
warranted before expanding adolescent decision-making authority with respect to

5. Plastic Surgery for Teenagers Briefing Paper, AM. SOC'Y OF PLASTIC SURGEONS,
http://www.plasticsurgery.org/news-and-resources/briefing-papers/plastic-surgery-for-teenagers.htm
(last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
6. See Catherine Saint Louis, This Teenage Girl Uses Botox. And, No, She's Not Alone., N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at El. Although some of these injections may have been to treat excessive
sweating or facial twitching, a significant portion appears to have been simply to shape the face. Id.
7. PEw RESEARCH CTR., MILLENNIALS - A PORTRAIT OF GENERATION NEXT: CONFIDENT.

CONNECTED. OPEN TO CHANGE. 1 (2010).
8. See Anne E. Laumann & Amy J. Derick, Tattoos and Body Piercings in the United States: A
National Data Set, J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 413, 413, 414 tbl.1 (2006); see also C.W. Nevius, Teen
Body Piercing: Rite of Passage, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 8, 2005, at BI (describing the growth in the tattoo
and piercing businesses).
9. But see Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-Ethical Limits of
Self-Modification, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148 (2004); Alicia Ouellette, Shaping ParentalAuthority over
Children's Bodies, 85 IND. L.J. 955, (2010), for articles that discuss the legal and ethical issues
surrounding adolescent body modification.
10. See, e.g., Paul Arshagouni, "But I'm an Adult Now ... Sort Of": Adolescent Consent in Health
Care Decision-Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 315, 316 (2006)
(suggesting a new method "for determining when adolescents can and should be allowed to make
independent health care decisions"); Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors
Should Have the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 109, 110
(2000); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislationfor Adolescent Medical DecisionMaking, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 409, 411 (2002) (describing how the presumption that minors lack
capacity in the medical context "is tenuous at best" and there is "little, if any evidence, to support it");
Adele D. Hofmann, A Rational Policy Toward Consent and Confidentiality in Adolescent Health Care,
I J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH CARE 9, 9 (1980) (proposing an approach for future policy based on
"contemporary adolescent cognitive and psychosocial developmental principles"); Kimberly M.
Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare Decision-MakingRights for
Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 251, 303 (2005) (arguing that state laws should rest on the
presumption that adolescents aged fourteen to seventeen have the decisional capability to make health
care decisions); Michelle Oberman, Minor Rights and Wrongs, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 127, 127 (1996)
(stating that the law governing adolescent health care decision making does not fully take into account
adolescent capacity); Jennifer L. Rosato, Let's Get Real: Quilting a PrincipledApproach to Adolescent
Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 769, 770 (2002) (proposing a
restructuring of the health care consent laws based more on the reality of adolescents' decision-making
capabilities).
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cosmetic body modification"-in or out of the medical context. In fact, research in
developmental science reveals immaturities in adolescent cognition-impetuousness,
risk-taking, and susceptibility to peer pressure-that are directly relevant to
decisions about body modification.12 As such, policies that protect adolescents from
unnecessary risk-such as age restrictions and parental consent laws-are
warranted in the context of cosmetic body modification.
This essay examines the phenomenon of body modification among
adolescents from a legal perspective. In particular, it culls together the law of body
modification and positions it generally within the law regarding adolescent decision
making.' 3 It then briefly reviews the ways in which the law of adolescents is shaped
both by our understanding of the parent-child relationship and the available
scientific evidence concerning brain development and executive function.14 The
essay then considers how the law's principal approach to body modification in
adolescents-a requirement of parental consent-works for and against adolescents
in practice.' 5 The essay argues that although the scientific research into the
development of the adolescent brain and executive functioning support increased
decision-making authority for adolescents with respect to most health care,
cosmetic body modification is different.' 6 Requirements for parental consent for
body modification are an appropriate means of protecting adolescents from the
limitations of their cognitive function. However, laws that give parents ultimate
control over adolescent bodies fail to respect the developing autonomy and liberty
interests of teens. Neither parental consent alone nor a parent's veto should be the
sole determinant of whether an adolescent's body is cosmetically modified through
medical intervention.' 7 Modification should take place, with parental consent, only
when the adolescent has made a persistent, unambiguous, and informed choice,
and, without parental consent, in the rare case in which medical professionals agree

11. As used in this paper, the term "cosmetic body modification" does not include reconstructive
surgery or other interventions used to correct a clear abnormality or malformation, such as a cleft lip or
palate. Instead, it refers to invasive interventions used to improve or change an otherwise "normal"
appearance. Obviously, the distinction between "normal" and abnormal appearance is not always clear.
How to clarify the distinction is a topic for another paper. Functionality is certainly one factor.
12. See Laurence Steinberg, Cognitive and Affective Development in Adolescence, 9 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE Sci. 69, 69 (2005) (explaining that adolescents experience significant changes in brain
functioning related to response inhibition and risk taking).
13. See infra Part II.
14. See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
15. See infra Part Ill.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See discussion Part VI; see also Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission,
and Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 315 (1995) (discussing the development of the
child as a "person" and that adolescents should be involved in the decision-making process as much as
their cognitive abilities allow).
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with a determined adolescent that body modification is urgent to prevent
psychological or other harm.' 8

1.THE

LAW OF ADOLESCENCE

The law of adolescence reflects the threshold state of the teenager-neither
adult nor child. Betwixt and between, the law takes something of a scattershot
approach to adolescent decision making. At times, the law affords little or no
weight to the choices of teenagers, or limits their choices in order to protect them. 9
Thus, teenagers cannot legally purchase alcohol; 20 those under eighteen can't
vote, 21serve on juries, or gamble legally. 22 Depending on the state, an adolescent's
consent to sexual activity may be invalid and the act of sex with the teen deemed
statutory rape. 23 At other times, the law gives as much respect to the decisions of
teenagers as it does those made by adults. 24 Older teens can drop out of high
school, hold jobs, and drive cars.25 In some cases, juveniles may be tried and
sentenced as adults for crimes they commit while teenagers. 26

18. See Hazel Beh & Milton Diamond, Ethical Concerns Related to Treating Gender
Nonconformity in Childhood and Adolescence: Lessons from the Family Court ofAustralia, 15 HEALTH
MATRIX 239, 244-45 (2005) (using a case study of a minor's gender identity dismorphia to illustrate
that these types of medical decisions should be made based on the adolescent's individual
circumstances, even if he or she is not mature enough to be involved in the decision-making process).
19. See generally Megan E. Hay, Note, Incremental Independence: Conforming the Law to the
Process of Adolescence, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 663 (2009) (discussing the historical
development of the laws governing children and arguing for a revised legal framework for adolescent
decision making).
20. See National Minimum Age Drinking Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2006) (withholding ten percent of
a state's federal highway fund allotment if the purchase or possession of alcohol for people under age
twenty-one remains legal).
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
22. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.086(12)(b) (West 2000) (prohibiting any person under
eighteen years of age from gambling); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 432.219(3)(a) (West 2001) (making
gambling under the age of twenty-one punishable as a misdemeanor); N.Y. JUD. LAW § 510(2)
(McKinney 2003) (prohibiting jurors from being less than eighteen-years-old).
23. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-70(c)(1) (LexisNexis 2005) (deeming those under sixteen years
of age to be incapable of providing consent); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.04(A) (LexisNexis 2010)
(prohibiting anyone eighteen-years-or-older from engaging in sexual conduct with anyone who is known
to be younger than sixteen).
24. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1966) (holding that juveniles must be afforded the same
procedural due process rights as adults).
25. See, e.g., MD CODE ANN., TRANSP. § 16-103 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011) (prohibiting the
Department of Motor Vehicle administration from issuing a provisional driver's license to anyone under
age sixteen and six months); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-8-11 (LexisNexis 2008) (taking away the driver's
license of a student who drops out of high school).
26. See generally OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TRYiNG JUVENILES As ADULTS IN CRIMINAL COURT: AN ANALYSIS

OF STATE TRANSFER PROVISIONS (1998) (providing a comprehensive overview of the circumstances, in

which juveniles may be transferred from juvenile court and tried as adults).
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The complexity of the law of adolescence is especially acute in the medical
arena. 27 For the vast majority of medical decisions, the law treats adolescents under
the age of eighteen like young children. That is, except in the situations discussed
below, teenagers' decisions about health care have no legal weight until they have
reached the age of legal consent. 28 Instead, the law vests parents with decisionmaking authority for their teenagers. 29 Thus, a physician cannot legally treat an
adolescent without parental consent in most cases. 30 There are some exceptions,
however. For example, the law of many states treats certain teens-those who are
pregnant, emancipated, and married-like adults. 31 And a handful of jurisdictions
recognize through statutory or case law a "mature minor" doctrine that grants
decision-making authority about healthcare to mature adolescents. 32 In addition to
affording decision-making power to teenagers based on status, laws in many states
allow teens to make their own decisions about certain adult-like interventions, such
as drug treatment, contraception, and abortion. 33 And even in states in which
parental notification or consent is required before a minor can obtain an abortion,
the Supreme Court has held that the state must provide an alternative procedure
whereby the minor can obtain an abortion if she is mature enough to make an
27. See David M. Vukadinovich, Minors' Rights to Consent to Treatment: Navigating the
Complexity ofState Laws, 37 J. HEALTH L. 667, 667-68 (2004) (explaining that while the law governing
the right to refuse medical treatment for adults is clear, the state of this same type of law for minors is
unclear).
28. See Comm. On Pediatric Emergency Med. & Comm. on Bioethics, Consent for Emergency
Medical Services for Children and Adolescents, 128 PEDIATRICS 427, 427 (2011) (noting that
adolescents can consent absent parental consent in some cases, but not others).
29. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (noting that "parents can and must make" medical
decisions regarding their teenage children). See generally Lawrence Schlam & Joseph P. Wood,
Informed Consent to the Medical Treatment of Minors: Law and Practice, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 141,
148-52 (2000) (describing that doctors must obtain parental consent prior to performing most medical
procedures on minors).
30. See Comm. On Pediatric Emergency Med. & Comm. on Bioethics, supra note 28, at 427.
31. See GUTrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF MINORS' CONSENT LAW

1 (2012) (indexing the variety of state laws that treat pregnant minors as adults); see also CAL. FAM.
CODE §§7000-7002 (West 2004) (defining emancipation under California law); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 210/1 (West 2011) (permitting a minor who is either married, pregnant, or a parent to consent to
medical care).
32. The mature minor doctrine is generally a common law matter, though a few states such as Ohio
and Illinois have adopted the doctrine by statute. See 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/1 (West 2011);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(3) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.030(2) (LexisNexis 2010); OHIO
REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 3709.241, 3719.012, 5122.04 (LexisNexis 2008); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 328
(111.1989); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1970); Bach v.
Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966); Lacey v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25,
27 (Ohio 1956); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987); Belcher v. Charleston Area
Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 837 (W. Va. 1992). But see Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1154
(Pa. 2000) (rejecting the mature minor doctrine in Pennsylvania). For more specifics about the workings
of the mature minor doctrine, see Arshagouni, supranote 10, at 336.
33. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 210/4 (West 2011) (allowing minors twelve years or older
to consent to drug treatment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-34-107 (2006) (permitting minors to receive
contraception supplies and information without parental consent).
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informed decision in consultation with a physician or, even if she lacks such
maturity, if the abortion would be in her best interests. 34
II. THE LAW OF BODY MODIFICATION

The laws surrounding body modification on adolescents differ somewhat
depending on the setting in which the modification takes place.35 Cosmetic body
modification procedures take place both in and out of the medical setting. 36 Those
interventions that involve the most physical risk, professional skill, or medical
training-such as surgical interventions, Botox, and hormone injections-are
ordinarily performed by medical professionals. 37 Some medical professionals also
perform lower risk modifications such as body piercings and tattoos.38 Of course,
tattoos and piercings are also available at many distinctly nonmedical shops, malls,
and parlors. 39
In the healthcare setting, the general rule requiring parental consent for
minors applies to minors seeking body modification through plastic surgery,
injection, or other interventions. 40 There are a handful of cosmetic interventions
that are subject to specific restrictions at law. 4 1 For example, a federal law bans
female genital cutting on girls under the age of eighteen. 42 But, with respect to nose

34. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642-44
(1979); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
35. Aglaja Stim, Body Piercing: Medical Consequences and Psychological Motivations, 361
LANCET 1205, 1208 (2003) (stating that the United States does not have any generally-applicable
regulations for body artists and that only thirteen states exercise control over tattoo establishments and
only six of these apply the regulations to body piercing establishments).
36. Id. at 1207.
37. See Avoid at All Cost (No Matter How Cheap): Do-t- Yourself Botox, THE AM. SOC'Y FOR
AESTHETIC PLASTIC SURGERY, http://www.surgery.org/consumers/plastic-surgery-news-briefs/avoidcost-no-matter-cheap--do-it-yourself-botox-1035624 (last visited Jan. 19, 2012) (evaluating the risks of
doing Botox at home and urging those considering botox injections to see a medical professional).
38. Stim, supra note 35, at 1207.
39. Id
40. Diana Zuckerman & Anisha Abraham, Teenagers and Cosmetic Surgery: Focus on Breast
Augmentation and Liposuction, 43 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 318, 322 (2008) (stating that a teenager
under eighteen can get cosmetic surgery, including breast augmentation, as long as there is parental
consent).
41. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006) (prohibiting the cutting of female genital of a minor under
eighteen years of age except for when it is necessary for the health of the minor).
42. For example, 18 U.S.C § 116 (2006) states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), whoever knowingly circumcises,
excises, or infibulates the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or
clitoris of another person who has not attained the age of eighteen years shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(b) A surgical operation is not a violation of this section if the operation is (1) necessary to the health of the person on whom it is performed, and is performed by a
person licensed in the place of its performance as a medical practitioners; or
(2) performed on a person in labor or who has just given birth and is performed for
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jobs, tummy tucks, liposuction, Botox injections, or growth and sex hormones, U.S.
law turns to parents to make decisions for adolescents, unless the teenager is
medically emancipated or otherwise vested with decision-making capacity. 43 Thus,
the minor adolescent will almost never receive a desired intervention without
parental consent.44 As long as a parent consents to the procedure, however-and
the procedure is performed by a licensed medical provider-the law is generally
satisfied. 45 Even breast implants, which are regulated by the FDA and subject to
some age guidelines, are available off-label to teenagers, so long as a parent
consents. 46
Outside the healthcare setting, body modification procedures for minors may
be harder to come by-or more readily available-than medical modifications.
Availability depends upon state law. 4 7 While some states do not place age limits on
piercing or tattooing, 48 others, such as South Carolina, make it illegal to tattoo or
pierce the body of person under the age of eighteen, regardless of parental
consent. 49 The vast majority of states require consent before an adolescent can be
tattooed, and many require parental consent before a minor can have a part of the

medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by a person licensed in the place it
is performed as a medical practitioner, midwife, or person in training to become such a
practitioner of midwife.
(c) In applying subsection (b)(1), no account shall be taken of the effect on the person
on whom the operation is to be performed of any belief on the part of that person, or any
other person, that the operation is required as a matter of custom or ritual.
43. Zuckerman & Abraham, supra note 40, at 322.
44. See Sonja Shield, The Doctor Won't See You Now: Rights of Transgender Adolescents to Sex
Reassignment Treatment, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 361, 363 (2007) (lamenting the legal
barriers teens face when seeking sex-reassignment surgery).
45. See id. (stating that a parent must consent to a minor getting the procedure).
46. Zuckerman & Abraham, supra note 40, at 319. The FDA approved saline-filled breast implants
for breast augmentation in women age eighteen or older and for breast reconstruction in women of any
age. Id. at 319. Silicone gel-filled breast implants are approved for breast augmentation in women age
twenty-two or older and for breast reconstruction in women of any age. CTR. FOR DEVICES &
RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., FDA UPDATE ON THE SAFETY OF SILICONE
GEL-FILLED BREAST IMPLANTS 5 (2011),
47. See Tattoos and Body Piercings for Minors, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,

http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspxtabid=14393 (last updated Oct. 2011) (noting that state regulations
prevent minors from obtaining tattoos and body piercings without parental consent).
48. Id. (providing that in some states minors can obtain tattoos and body piercings with parental
permission).

49. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-34-60 (2010). Tattooing a minor is also illegal, regardless of parental
consent, in California, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New York, Oklahoma, and Washington. CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 653 (West 2010); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-10 (2002 & Supp. 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. §
135.37 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 4203 (1999); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
260.21 (McKinney 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 842.1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.28.085 (West 2005).
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body other than the earlobe pierced.50 Some states have very specific laws. For
example, Florida requires a written notarized consent before a minor may obtain a
tattoo or body piercing, and the physical presence of a parent if the adolescent is
less than sixteen-years-old.5' West Virginia specifically prohibits piercing of a
minor's genitalia or nipples. 52 Georgia prohibits tattooing of an adolescent unless it
is performed by physician or osteopath, and then only with parental consent.53 In
Virginia, not only is consent required before a minor can be tattooed or have a body
part pierced, the minor's parent must be present during the procedure. 54 Texas
allows a parent to consent to a tattoo on a minor only to cover an existing tattoo
deemed offensive or obscene.55
Thus, the law generally vests parents with decision-making authority about
modifying their adolescent children's bodies so long as the modification takes place
in a medical setting. 56 Outside the medical setting, a parent may be unable to give
an effective consent even for an otherwise lawful procedure (e.g., tattooing or
piercing) in one state, and a minor may be able to obtain the modification (e.g.,
nipple or nose piercing) without the consent of or notice to the parent in another.57
These variations play out in odd ways. For example, a seventeen-year-old West
Virginian with permissive parents can get breast implants, but not a nipple
piercing.5 s And a seventeen-year-old Vermonter must have parental consent to have
a mole removed by a physician but not to have her eyebrow or nipple pierced. 59
These variations in law raise questions about the rationale for the current rules.
Ill. REASONS FOR THE RULES

The complexity of law respecting decision making by teenagers reflects the
varied roles adolescents play in our constitutional system, and the interests that
arise from each. First, teenagers are rights-bearing citizens, and in some cases, the

50. Tattoos and Body Piercings for Minors, supra note 47 (outlining how some states prohibit
minors from obtaining tattoos, and how other states prevent minors from obtaining body piercing or
tattoos without parental consent).
51. FLA. STAT. ANN. §381.00787 (West 2012).
52. W.VA. CODE R. § 64-80-13.1 (2011).
53. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-71(a) (2011).
54. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-371.3 (2009).
55. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 146.012 (West 2010).
56. Tattoos and Body Piercings for Minors, supra note 47. To be sure, ethical principles and good
medical practice require that an adolescent assent to treatment. Tara L. Kuther, Medical DecisionMaking and Minors: Issues of Consent and Assent, 38 ADOLESCENCE 343, 351 (2003). Assent is not
required by law, however, and is, in any event, less meaningful than informed consent. Id.
57. See infra notes 47 50.
58. W. VA. CODE R. § 64-80-13.1 (2011).
59. 20-4 VT. CODE R. § 18:3.6 (2012) (establishing procedures for tattooing a minor but explicitly
leaving the decision about whether to perform a body piercing on a minor up to the "sound judgment" of
registered body piercers).
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law protects them as such. 60 Second, teenagers are minors, "whose immaturity,
inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise
their rights wisely." 61 As such, states often seek to protect teens from the
consequences of poor decision making. 62 And finally, minor adolescents are part of
an autonomous family unit, over which parents have a constitutionally protected
right of control. 63 Although these interests have been analyzed in depth elsewhere,M
it is useful to review briefly how the Supreme Court understands and balances each
before considering their weight in the context of body modification.
The first interest, that of the teenager as a rights bearing citizen,65 is in many
respects the least robust. The Supreme Court has consistently declared adolescents
to be "persons" generally "protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
government deprivations as are adults." 66 In a case recognizing a minor's right to
terminate her pregnancy, the Court explained that "[c]onstitutional rights do not

60. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1976) (noting that minors possess
constitutional rights just as adults do).
61. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
634-39).
62. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text (describing the various state regulations for the
tattooing and piercing of minors).
63. Parents have the rights "to bring up a child in the way he should go." Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 164, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal ... that the custody, care, and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
neither supply nor hinder."). The "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972).
64. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 295-98 (1988)
(describing the traditional view of "parenthood as exchange" and a new construction of the relationship
between parent and child, away from parents' rights toward parents' responsibility for constructing a
nurturing relationship with their child); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Welfare:
Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1994) (arguing that the
"proffered justifications for parents' rights are in fact unsound" and that the "law confer[s] on parents
simply a child-rearing privilege, limited in its scope to actions and decisions not inconsistent with the
child's temporal interests"); Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 267, 268 (1995) (advocating for international human rights for children as a means of respecting
children as human beings without displacing or undermining parents); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse,
"Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights": The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 BYU J. PUB.
L. 321, 321 (1994) (introducing the idea of an "adult's relationship with children as one of trusteeship
rather than as one of ownership"); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered
Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747, 1811 (1993) (considering parents as
fiduciaries entrusted with their children's care and empowered to care for them).
65. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (concluding that "the child's right is virtually
coextensive with that of an adult"); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74
(1975) (describing that the constitution protects both minors and adults alike).
66. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44 (holding that a minor's right to abortion requires that statutes
requiring parental consent contain a judicial bypass procedure). See also Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74
(stating that minors possess constitutional rights); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (stating that
young people possess due process rights even within a school setting); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30-31
(1967) (stating that juveniles must be afforded due process in a delinquency hearing).
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mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age
of majority."67 Thus, the Court has recognized, for example, that adolescents have a
first amendment right to wear black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War, 68 due
process rights in juvenile proceedings, 69 and an interest in freedom from
unnecessary medical treatment and confinement. 70
Protection of the adolescents' interests as a rights holder is tempered,
however, in almost all cases, by the state's interest in accounting for "the peculiar
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed,
mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in childrearing." 71 The
state's interest in protecting minors justifies "state-imposed requirements that a
minor obtain his or her parent's consent before undergoing an operation, marrying,
or entering military service." 72 It also allows states to criminalize conduct involving
minors, such as the sale or exposure to dangerous products and activities, in a
manner that would be unconstitutional if it involved adults. 73 In other words, it is
well settled that "the States validly may limit the freedom of children to choose for
themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially serious
consequences." 74
Although the protection of teenagers through the curtailment of the liberties
often draws sharp criticism among advocates for adolescent rights, the Supreme
Court's recognition that teenagers are not fully formed adults was celebrated by

67. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
68. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
69. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 10, 30-31 (holding that that juveniles charged with committing
delinquent acts receive basic due process protections, including the privilege against self-incrimination,
rights to counsel, notice of charges, and ability to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses); see
also Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2638 (2009) (holding a student's
rights were violated by strip search at school); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (interpreting the
Due Process clause in juvenile delinquency cases to require the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of
proot); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 600-01 (1948) (holding that a minor prosecuted in the adult
criminal justice system retains the basic constitutional rights in those proceedings). But see Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265 (1984) (holding that pretrial preventive detention of juveniles does not
constitute punishment, in part because "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody");
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that the right to jury trial is not required
by the Due Process clause during the adjudicative stage ofjuvenile proceedings).
70. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) ("[A] child, in common with adults, has a
substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment . . . under the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
71. Belloti, 443 U.S. at 634. See also New Jersey v. T.L.0, 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (noting that
in public schools, the Fourth Amendment rights of students are not automatically coextensive with the
rights of adults).
72. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444-45 (1990).
73. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968) (upholding a law regulating the sale
of obscene materials to minors under seventeen and finding law did not constitute "an invasion of such
minors' constitutionally protected freedoms").
74. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 635.
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juvenile justice advocates when the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons75 that
the death penalty could not be applied to adolescent offenders. In addition to two
lines of reasoning not relevant to this essay, Justice Kennedy, writing for the
majority in Roper, reasoned that adolescents lack the maturity necessary to be held
as morally reprehensible as adult offenders. 76 Critically, Kennedy relied on research
in developmental science that confirms "[a] lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility ... in youth . .. often result[s] in impetuous

and ill-considered actions and decisions." 77 Further, Kennedy cited studies that
demonstrated that youth are especially susceptible to external and peer pressure,
and that their identities are more transitory and less fixed than that of adults.78
Consistent with its conclusion that juveniles cannot be trusted to exercise their own
right to make medical decisions, the Court concluded that the differences between
adults and adolescents are legally significant when it comes to criminal
punishment.79 According to the majority in Roper:
The susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior
means "their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as
that of an adult." Their own vulnerability and comparative lack of
control over their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a
greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape negative
influences in their whole environment.80
In addition to state-sponsored protections for vulnerable youth, the Supreme
Court has affirmed the important role of parents in care, custody, and control of
adolescents. 8' Parental control is rooted in familial autonomy.82 The Court has long
recognized the "family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children"
in which the parents have the authority to raise children as the parents see fit.83 The
right to familial autonomy allows parents to make most decisions about the care

75. 543 U.S. 551, 572-73 (2005) ("The differences between juvenile and adult offenders are too
marked and well understood to risk allowing a youthful person to receive the death penalty despite
insufficient culpability.").
76. Id. at 571 (finding that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment where a criminal's
culpability is diminished because of youth and immaturity).
77. Id. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
78. Id. at 569-70.
79. Id. at 569 (finding that certain crucial differences between those under eighteen and adults
prevent juvenile offenders from being classified as if they were the same as the worst adult offenders).
80. Id. at 570 (citation omitted).
81. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (finding that "the custody, care and nurture
of the child reside first in the parents," as there are certain functions of parents that the state cannot
perform or inhibit).
82. See id. at 166 (finding that past court decisions recognized family life as a protected realm that
the state must refrain from infringing on).
83. Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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and keeping of children without government oversight or interference.8 4 Parental
authority extends to medical decision making for adolescents.8 5 Indeed, in a case
involving psychiatric care for a teenager, the Court said parents "can and must"
make medical judgments for children. 86 "Most children, even in adolescence,
simply are not able to make sound judgments concerning many decisions, including
their need for medical care or treatment," 87 reasoned the Court. The child's wishes
are essentially irrelevant. "The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or
complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not diminish the
parents' authority to decide what is best for [a] child."88
Of course, parental rights are not unfettered. They must be balanced against
the State's interest in protecting children and preservation of the child's rights. 9
Thus, States may limit parental rights through abuse and neglect proceedings, 90
child labor laws, 91 and mandatory vaccination laws. 92 With respect to medical
84. "Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are among associational
rights [the Supreme] Court has ranked as 'of basic importance in our society,' . . . rights sheltered by the
Fourteenth Amendment against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect." M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (citation omitted). Parents therefore have a constitutionally protected
"liberty interest ... in the care, custody, and management of their child . . . ." Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (noting that the "rights
to conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential' and 'basic civil rights of man')
(citation omitted); Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (finding that the rule that "the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents" is well-settled); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting
that the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the right to "establish a home
and bring up children"); Hurlman v. Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that a parent cannot
be deprived of his or her custody interest in a minor child without due process); van Emrick v. Chemung
Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 911 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1990) (finding that the liberty interest of parents
in the "care, custody, and management of their child . . . includes a significant decision-making role
concerning medical procedures . . .") (citation omitted).
85. See, e.g., Parham, 442 U.S. at 603 (finding that because most children cannot make sound
judgments on certain issues, parents have the ability and responsibility to make judgments for their
children on those issues).
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id. at 604.
89. See id. at 630 (finding that children have rights and interests that limit even parental rights).
90. The State has a profound interest in the welfare of the child, particularly his or her being
sheltered from abuse. For example, in "[elmergency circumstances . . . in which the child is immediately
threatened with harm" a child may be taken into custody by a responsible State official without court
authorization or parental consent, although "the mere 'possibility' of danger" is not enough. Huriman v.
Rice, 927 F.2d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). If it was, officers would always be justified
in seizing a child without a court order whenever there was suspicion that the child might have been
abused. See id. The law thus seeks to strike a balance among the rights and interests of parents, children,
and the State. See Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 739 (10th Cir. 1997) (relying on statutory
schemes that balance the protected interests); see also Robison v. Via, 821 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1987)
(citing the well-established rule that officials can take a child from the parent without their consent ifan
emergency exists).
91. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 228-29 (1972) (holding that while the state had a
compelling interest in "compulsory schooling," Amish children were allowed to quit schooling and
begin working after graduating eighth grade because of their parents' religious belief in preparing for
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decision making, then, States can take certain choices out of the hands of parents
through prohibitions (laws against female circumcision, for example),93 mandates
(mandatory vaccination laws), 94 or laws that shift decision-making power to the
minor (for contraception or drug treatment). 95 And when the interest of the youth is
especially strong, such as with decisions about whether to carry a pregnancy to
term, the State cannot totally divest an adolescent of decision-making power by
giving a parent the right to veto an abortion. 96 Nonetheless, the general rule and
operating presumption at law is that parents are best equipped to make medical
decisions for their adolescent children. 97 That rule applies to body modification

life in the Amish community); Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325-26 (1913)
(upholding prohibition against work by children under the age of sixteen in hazardous occupations).
"Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the statedefined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights." Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See also
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975) (finding that minors facing suspension have a constitutional
right, under the Due Process Clause, to, at a minimum "rudimentary precautions against unfair or
mistaken findings of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school"); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that school children possess fundamental rights
under the Constitution, including freedom to express their views, in the absence of valid reasons to
disallow that expression); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (holding that both the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth amendment protect both adults and minors).
92. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) ("For their own good and
that of their classmates, public school children are routinely required . . . to be vaccinated against
various diseases."); Zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 176-77 (1922) (finding that a statute mandating
compulsory vaccination for schoolchildren was within the state's police power to regulate public health).
93. Female circumcision is illegal regardless of parental consent. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 116 (2006)
(prohibiting the cutting of female genital of a minor under eighteen years of age except for when it is
necessary for the health of the minor); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-34 (West 2002 & Supp. 2011)
("[W]hoever knowingly circumcises, excises, or infibulates, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia
minora, or clitoris of another commits female genital mutilation. Consent to the procedure by a minor . .
. or by the minor's parent or guardian is not a defense . . . ."); see also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.35 (West
2006) ("Consent by the female minor or by a parent of the female minor to the circumcision, excision or
infibulation" may not be "asserted as a defense to prosecution.").
94. In terms of mandatory vaccinations, a state may require them even if parents do not consent.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
95. In some states, "[a] minor has the same capacity as an adult to consent to . . . treatment for or
advice about contraception other than sterilization." See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 20102(c)(5) (West 2009) (emphasis added). In Maryland, a person under the age of eighteen "has the same
capacity as an adult to consent to treatment for and advice about drug abuse . . . [and] alcoholism." Id. §
20-102(c)(1)-(2) (West 2009) (emphasis added). But see id. § 20-102(c-l) (West 2009) ("The capacity
of a minor to consent to treatment for drug abuse or alcoholism . . . does not include the capacity to
refuse treatment" in a certified "inpatient alcohol or drug abuse treatment program ... for which a
parent or guardian has given consent.").
96. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74 (holding that the State cannot give a third party the ability to veto
the decision of a woman and her physician to terminate her pregnancy).
97. See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 10, at 771-72 (explaining that the general rule that parents are the
only persons capable of giving consent for their minor child is based on the rationale that children lack
the required experience and maturity, as well as the belief that "parents know best what will serve their
own child's interests").
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procedures except where state law makes an exception for tattooing or body
piercing.98
IV.

TRENDS AND CALLS FOR INCREASED DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY FOR
TEENS

The default rule giving parents medical decision-making authority over the
bodies of their adolescent children has drawn criticism. 99 Medical, bioethical, and
legal scholars persuasively argue for increased autonomy for adolescents with
respect to medical decision making, 0 and some state courts and legislatures have
afforded teenagers medical decision-making authority.' 0 Mechanics of the laws or
proposals for law differ: some call for individual assessment of each adolescent's
maturity;1 02 others for across the board lowering of the age of majority; 03 and still
others call for a kind of "sliding scale" that would give adolescents an increasing

98. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 2 10/1 (West 2011) (stating that for the purposes of
medical treatment, a minor who is married, pregnant, or a parent, or any person over eighteen, has the
same legal capacity, powers, and obligations as someone of legal age); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(3)
(LexisNexis 2009) (stating that any female, regardless of age, may consent to any medical treatment in
relation to pregnancy or childbirth); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 129.030(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (noting that
the consent of a minor's parents or guardians is not required for treatment when the minor is married,
has had a child, or in imminent danger due to a health risk); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 3709.241,
3719.012 (LexisNexis 2005), OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5122.04 (LexisNexis 2008) (providing that a
minor may give consent to treatment for venereal diseases, conditions caused by drug or alcohol abuse,
or non-medical outpatient mental health services); see also In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 28 (111.
1989) (finding that where a minor is determined mature enough to control her own health care, she may
do so); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337 (Kan. 1970) (finding that
a parent's consent "may not be necessary or required" and a minor's consent would be sufficient
depending upon "his ability to understand and comprehend the nature of the surgical procedure, the risks
involved and the probability of attaining the desired results in the light of the circumstances which
attend"); Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 267 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290-91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (holding
that there are exceptions to the rule that minors must have a parent's or guardian's consent to act); Lacey
v. Laird, 139 N.E.2d 25, 34 (Ohio 1956) (finding that surgery performed on an eighteen -year-old with
her consent, but without parental consent, was not an assault and battery); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724
S.W.2d 739, 749 (Tenn. 1987) (noting that mature minors "appreciate the nature, the risks, and the
consequences of the medical treatment involved"); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d
827, 835 (W. Va. 1992) (finding that mature minors "may be involved in the medical decisions that
affect their livelihood"). But see Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Pa. 2000) (rejecting
the mature minor doctrine in Pennsylvania).
102. See, e.g., Rosato, supra note 10, at 787-88 (finding that the trend with regards to how the law
should treat adolescents in the juvenile justice context favors "requiring an individualized determination
of competence," although that approach might not be the best with regards to health care decision
making).
103. See, e.g., Andrew Newman, Adolescent Consent to Routine Medical and Surgical Treatment: A
Proposal to Simplify the Law of Teenage Medical Decision-Making, 22 J. LEGAL MED. 501, 531 -32
(2001) (arguing that the age of consent should be 16 years old in the healthcare setting); see also
Mutcherson, supra note 10, at 255 (arguing that the age of consent should be lowered to fourteen and
that parents and adolescents share decision-making responsibility for most healthcare decisions).

20121

BODY MODIFICATION AND ADOLESCENT DECISION MAKING

143

ability to decide about a given treatment depending on the expected therapeutic
benefit.'" The nuances of the arguments and proposals for increased medical
decision-making rights for adolescents are beyond the scope of this essay, 05 but
consideration of the main points of argument helps illuminate their application to
body modification. Although the arguments are rooted in bioethics, moral theory,
developmental science, public health, and public policy, they make similar basic
points.
First, adolescents are rights bearing citizens who deserve respect as full
human persons.1 06 Although their ability to exercise their rights, or to act as fully
autonomous beings may be developing, the adolescent has rights to bodily
integrity, self-determination, and privacy.' 07 To best respect the person of the
adolescent, these rights should be recognized and protected to a degree
commensurate with the ability of the individual involved to exercise them.' 08 The
costs of disrespecting the adolescent as a rights bearing person are high.109 As
Professor Jennifer Rosato, a strong proponent of increased decision-making rights
for adolescents argues, failure to respect the "burgeoning autonomy" of adolescents
will likely harm "their personhood, especially when the health care decision
involves the exercise of moral judgment. If adolescents cannot make these
decisions for themselves, they may be forced to live a life they have not chosen and
certain future opportunities may be foreclosed to them permanently.""l0
To measure the ability of adolescents to engage capably in medical decision
making, and address the law's discordant approach to adolescent decision-making

104. See, e.g., Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical Treatment, 13
HEALTH MATRIX 297, 298 (2003) (arguing that adolescent competency should be determined on a
sliding scale); Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 359 (arguing that adolescents should be given a
presumption of capacity in low risk, routine health procedures with no long term consequences and
should be presumed not to have decision-making capacity for high risk medical procedures, or
procedures that have longer-term consequences, absent evidence to rebut that presumption).
105. For a summary of the arguments, see Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 352-59.
106. See Mutcherson, supra note 10, at 273 (noting that autonomy is a positive notion in that it
encourages each person to be his own man or woman and reinforces that no individual is the possession
of another).
107. See id. at 319-20 (finding that adolescents have a right to self-determination and bodily
integrity); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74-75 (1976) (finding
that adolescents have a right to privacy).
108. See Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 359 (arguing that adolescents should be given independence
and autonomy commensurate with their abilities).
109. See Rosato, supra note 10, at 790 (noting that a failure to respect the rapidly increasing
autonomy of adolescents, especially regarding their moral judgment in healthcare decisions, is likely to
harm to their personhood because it will prevent them from making choices for themselves); see also
Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 316 (advocating for a better formulation to determine when adolescents
should be allowed to make their own health care decisions, as the current model encourages poor
medical decisions, such as putting off necessary medical treatment, as a result of the lack of autonomy
and privacy).
I10. Rosato, supra note 10, at 790.
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capacity,'" proponents reference developmental science.112 Reference
developmental science makes sense, explains Professor Rhonda Gay Hartman:
[T]the presumptive decisional incapacity that undergirds legislation
governing minors is tenuous at best. Despite its century-old shelf life,
there is comparatively little, if any, evidence to support it. The
Supreme Court's observation that adolescent inexperience and
vulnerability impede capable judgment for decision-making is, and
was, not supported by any evidence beyond the collective
"conventional wisdom" of a majority of the justices.... [R]esults
from other studies related to adolescent cognitive development and
capacity for decision-making contravene the presumption of
incapacity that underlies legislation.
These studies, along with
evolving societal and cultural norms, should inform and shape parens

to

patriae.1 3

Reference to science in determining the rights and responsibilities of
adolescents is also an approach apparently endorsed by the Supreme Court in
Roper.114

The science is fairly compelling. Consistently, research on the development
of adolescent decision making, judgment, and brain development supports the
capacity of adolescents in medical decision making, when the criteria for measuring
decisional capacity in adults are applied."' Capacity for medical decision making
exists (for adults) when a person has the ability to comprehend information relevant
to the decision, the ability to rationally deliberate in accordance with personal
values and goals, and the ability to communicate with caregivers. 116 In other words,
an adult is deemed to have capacity to make her own medical decisions so long as
she understands the risks, benefits, and alternatives of proposed medical options,
and can make and communicate an informed decision about what course to take.

111.Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS
L.J. 1265, 1287 (2000).
112. See, e.g., Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REv. 1055, 106364 (2010) (arguing for decisional autonomy for adolescents in healthcare based on research by
developmental scientists); see also Hartman, supra note 10, at 411 (noting that since the Supreme
Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), studies of "adolescent cognitive
development and capacity for decision-making" conflict with the presumption underlying legislation
that adolescents are incapable of making decisions, and that even in Yoder, the majority relied not on
scientific studies but merely the justices' "conventional wisdom"); Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 345
(encouraging policy makers to refer to science to understand adolescent development).
113. Hartman, supra note 10, at 411.
114. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
115. See Hamilton, supra note 112, at 1099-1118 (summarizing the most recent research on
adolescent brain development); see also Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 347-52 (describing the research
on adolescent brain and cognitive development).
116. Jessica Wilen Berg et al., Constructing Competence: Formulating Standards of Legal
Competence to Make Medical Decisions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 345, 351 (1996).
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Society does not demand that adults make good decisions, just that they understand
and appreciate the nature of the situation and the potential consequences of the
chosen courses of action."17 Developmental research shows that by age fifteen or
sixteen, adolescents are just as adept as adults in understanding and reasoning from
facts, processing information, and assessing and appreciating the nature of a given
situation." 8 That is, their cognitive and informational processing abilities are
mature.I" 9 These abilities-understanding and reasoning from facts, processing
information, and assessing and appreciating the nature of a given situation-are
roughly the equivalent of the abilities measured in assessing decision-making
capacity in adults.120 Because adolescents generally meet the criteria for decisionmaking capacity applied to measure capacity in adults, and because the ability of
adolescents to communicate is not in question, proponents argue that the
presumption of incapacity applied to adolescent medical decision making is

misplaced.121
To be sure, as the Supreme Court recognized in Roper, the cognitive abilities
and mature judgment of adolescents is deficient in certain contexts.1 22 The quality
of their decision making decreases when adolescents have to assess and react to
risk quickly, to make decisions in new environments, and to act in the presence of
peers.123 Their decisions may be "impetuous and ill-considered," especially if made
without time for deliberation or when influenced by peer pressure. 124 Some
proponents of increased decision making for adolescents account for these
limitations in their proposals for change.1 25 For example, Paul Arshagouni proposes
a rule that would give adolescents the presumptive right to make low-risk medical
decision but not high-risk decisions because of the scientific evidence concerning

117. Id. at 352 n.22.
118. Hamilton, supra note 112, at 1109 (citing various studies that have found a sixteen-year-old's
reasoning and information processing skills as "essentially indistinguishable" from an adult's skills).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1137-38, 1139. See also Lois A. Weithom & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of
Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEv. 1589, 1596 (1982)
(noting that research does not support "policies which deny adolescents the right of self-determination in
treatment situations on the basis of a presumption of incapacity to provide informed consent"); Rosato,
supra note 10, at 785 (referring to studies that "support the abandonment of the incompetence
presumption," but adding that these studies have had little effect on the law in this area).
122. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
123. Id. Abigail A. Baird & Jonathan A. Fugelsang, The Emergence of Consequential Thought:
Evidence from Neuroscience, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y B 1797, 1801-03 (2004)
(describing increased propensity for unnecessary risk taking by teens and providing explanation with
neuroscience).
124. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
125. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note 10, at 411 (noting that parens patriae, the philosophy that
government proactively should protect minors' welfare, "is central to crafting cohesive legislation that
recognizes adolescent legal autonomy for medical decision-making").
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risk taking by adolescents.' 26 But Arshagouni is in a minority. Most scholars argue
that the deficiencies (impulsiveness, excessive risk-taking, susceptibility to peer
pressure) are not relevant in the healthcare context to the same degree they are in
the juvenile justice context.127 After all, most medical decisions are unlikely to be
impetuous or heavily influenced by peer pressure given the private context in
which they are made and the necessary involvement of the adult professionals.1 28
Even the scholars willing to assume that decisional competence criteria is the same
in both context argue that "the balance of interests weighs much more favorably
toward giving older adolescents the ability to make their own health care
decisions." 29
Specifically, proponents argue that the state's interest in promoting the
development of fully capable, mature, engaged, and functioning citizens is served
by respecting adolescent autonomy in the healthcare. 30 Essentially, the argument is
that adolescents need to be given the opportunity to work out their decision-making
"muscles" in order to develop them more fully.131 Giving adolescents the power to
direct their own medical care gives them the opportunity to make important choices
for themselves, choices they will have to live with, in a preumptively safe
environment-one that is relatively separate from peer influence, and one that
necessarily involves the adolescent with adult professionals who serve as a
sounding board during the decision-making process.132 Respecting adolescents'
choices in this context allows them to develop and learn. 133 It "is likely to improve
their self-esteem and sense of control in the short term, and make them better
decision-makers and citizens in the long-term." 34 By contrast, protecting
adolescents from the consequences of their decisions hinders their development. 13

126. Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 359.
127. Donald L. Beschle, Cognitive Dissonance Revisited: Roper v. Simmons and the Issue of
Adolescent Decision-Making Competence, 52 WAYNE L. REv. I, 36-41 (2006).
128. See Laurence Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature than Adults?: Minors' Access to
Abortion, the Juvenile Death Penalty, and the Alleged APA "Flip-Flop", 64 AM. PsYCHOL. 583, 586,
592-93 (2009) (discussing the difference between adolescents' decisions to commit crimes, which
typically are influenced by peer pressure, and how medical decisions, specifically whether or not to have
an abortion, are made after consultations with adults).
129. Rosato, supra note 10, at 790; see also Hamilton, supra note 112, at 1138 (noting studies show
that adolescents want to make health care decisions and that they have the ability to make mature
decisions).
130. Rosato, supra note 10, at 790 (noting that adolescents gain a sense of self-worth from being
involved in decisions that affect them).
131. Id. at 790, 793.
132. See, e.g., Steinberg et al., supra note 128, at 592 (explaining that adolescents are just as capable
as adults in making mature decisions in several situations, including those involving medical decision
making, when peer pressure is less of a factor and objective information is available).
133. Rosato, supra note 10, at 790.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 793 (stating that allowing adolescents to make their own decisions helps them develop
into their own person).
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The fact that adolescents may sometimes make bad decisions does not outweigh
society's need to develop mature adolescents and engaged citizens "with their
entitlement to life-deciding liberty intact."' 36 Moreover, the involvement of
professional adults in medical decision making minimizes the risk of devastating
consequences. 37
The rights and science-based arguments for giving adolescents increased
decision-making authority in the healthcare context are buttressed by policy
arguments. For example, there is reason to believe that vesting adolescents with
decision-making authority can improve the relationship between doctor and patient
by ensuring confidentiality, which results in better health care for the adolescent.1 38
It also promotes public health by ensuring that risk-taking adolescents get health
care without fear of parental repercussions.' 3 9 And it may protect adolescents from
the consequences of their own behavior, especially where sexuality or other
morally charged issues are involved. 140 Together, the rights, science, and policy
arguments for increasing decisional autonomy for adolescents are compelling. The
question is whether they apply with equal force to cosmetic body modification.
V.

WITH BODY MODIFICATION, CAUTION IS IN ORDER

The arguments for increased decision-making authority for adolescents are
persuasive with respect to most healthcare decisions.141 They are not so robust,
however, with respect to cosmetic body modification-even that which occurs in
the medical setting. Although the rights of adolescents to bodily integrity, self
determination, and privacy are no less implicated by body modification than they
are by other medical interventions, developmental science suggests that a
competing interest, the need to protect adolescents as vulnerable, still-developing
persons, is far greater in the context of body modification than with respect to
health care generally.1 42 Specifically, cosmetic body modification differs from

136. Hamilton, supranote 112, at 1061.
137. Mutcherson, supra note 10, at 304.
138. Cf Abigail English & Madlyn Morreale, A Legal and Policy Frameworkfor Adolescent Health
Care: Past, Present, and Future, I HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 63, 63-64, 72, 105-06 (2001)
(emphasizing the importance of physician-patient confidentiality in improving medical care for
adolescents).
139. Mutcherson, supra note 10, at 270-71 (describing common situations, such as substance abuse,
mental illness and venereal disease, where adolescents can exercise medical decision-making
autonomy).
140. See id. at 269-71 (noting practical benefits of "healthcare emancipation statutes," including
protecting minors from harm they might cause themselves).
141. See supra Part IV.
142. See Ouellette, supra note 9, at 982-83 (arguing that medical interventions for children are
justified "only if necessary to meet the child's needs," and that when parents choose unnecessary
surgery for a child they "turn a healthy child into a patient and compromise a child's interests in bodily
integrity, safety, and freedom from confinement"); Mutcherson, supra note 10, at 303 (advocating a rule
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other medical interventions in at least three ways that are critical given what
science tells us about adolescent decision-making capacity.
First, cosmetic body modification involves unnecessary risk taking as
compared to other medical interventions. 143 No illness, injury, or organic cause
demands intervention to prevent degradation or deterioration.1 44 No physical
benefit offsets the physical risks.145 To be sure, some cosmetic interventions may
provide psychological or other benefits, but cosmetic modification is by definition,
elective and nonurgent.146 Yet, the risks are substantial. With cosmetic surgeries
such as breast reconstruction and liposuction, skin is cut or pierced, and bodies are
anesthetized.1 4 7 There is a risk of nerve damage, infection, reactions to anesthesia,
scarring, and death.148 With growth or gender hormones, there is risk of
musculoskeletal pain, aggression, and aggravation of kidney problems, diabetes,
hypertension, and cancer.149 Even the less risky modifications that take place
outside of the doctor's office are not risk free.1so Tattooing poses the risks of
infection (including hepatitis and HIV), allergies, removal problems, MRI
5
complications, keloid formation, scarring, and dissatisfaction.s'
Body piercing can
pose the risk of scarring, rejection, migration of the piercing, keloid formation, and

in which adolescents fourteen or older could make binding decisions, along with parents, about medical
care, but noting medical care "does not refer to care intended only to provide aesthetic enhancement").
143. See, e.g., Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 360 (noting the high risks associated with cosmetic
surgery).
144. See, e.g., Bishara S. Atiyeh et al., Aesthetic/Cosmetic Surgery and Ethical Challenges, 32
AESTHETIC PLASTIC SURGERY 829, 829-31 (2008) (noting that the focus of cosmetic plastic surgery is
"on improved appearance for its own sake," and is "life-enhancing, not life-saving").
145. An exception might be breast reduction surgeries, and surgeries to remove excess skin after
massive weight loss. Breast Reduction: Procedure, Risks, Benefits, Recovery, WEBMD,
http://www.webmd.com/healthy-beautylbreast-reduction (last visited Jan. 24, 2012). Breast reduction
surgery can relieve back pain and removal of a skin flap reduces risk of infection. Id. For these reasons,
the surgeries are not merely cosmetic, and may be subject to a different analysis. Id.
146. Zuckerman & Abraham, supranote 40, at 318, 320-21.
147. Zuckerman & Abraham, supranote 40, at 319.
148. Id.
149. See Rahul K. Parikh, Growth Hormones for Kids, SALON (Oct. 31, 2008, 6:44 AM),
http://www.salon.com/env/vitalsigns/2008/10/31/growthhormoneskids/ (providing a pediatrician's
view on the use of hGH in healthy kids); see also David B. Allen & Norman Fost, Commentary, hGH
for Short Stature: Ethical Issues Raised by Expanded Access, 144 J. PEDIATRICS 648 (2004) (cautioning
against over-use of hGH and mentioning concerns about its safety that periodically arise); Michael
Freemark, Editorial: Growth Hormone Treatment of "Idiopathic Short Stature": Not So Fast, 89 J.
CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY AND METABOLISM 3138, 3138-139 (2004) (discussing potential concerns

over use of hGH in healthy kids, although the long-terms risks of prolonged treatment are unknown);
Linda D. Voss, Growth Hormone Therapy for the Short Normal Child: Who Needs It and Who Wants
It?, 136 J. PEDIATRICS 103, 104 (2000) (claiming there is little justification for cosmetic endocrinology
without more significant data).
150. See
Tattoos
&
Permanent Makeup,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/cosmetics/productandingredientsafety/productinformation/ucml08530.htm
(last
updated Feb. 1, 2010) (outlining the various complications that can result from tattooing).
151. Id.; U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., THINK BEFORE YOU INK: ARE TATTOOS SAFE? (2008).
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in rare cases, hepatitis and HIV.152 Tongue piercing may cause dental fractures,
gum damage, and changes in mastication and speech. 15 3 Given the lack of
corresponding health benefit, the physical risks posed by cosmetic interventions
suggest a need for caution before they are used, especially in a population prone to
impulsivity and unnecessary risk taking as a matter of immature brain
development.154
Notably also, mounting evidence suggests that the population of persons
drawn to cosmetic body modification may be especially vulnerable to reckless
behavior. 55 Between six and fifteen percent of patients seeking cosmetic
treatments suffer from body dysmorphic disorder, a severe mental disorder that
affects body perception and often leads sufferers to seek multiple unnecessary
surgeries. 5 6 Women who received cosmetic breast augmentation are two times
more likely than women of the same age who did not receive surgery to commit
suicide, or die from alcohol or drug abuse.' 57 At least some studies suggest poor
outcomes in terms of self-esteem and quality of life for those who undergo
cosmetic surgery.'15 And teens that engage in tattooing and body piercing are far
more likely to be engaged in other high-risk activities involving illegal drugs, sex,
truancy, and thoughts of suicide.' 59 The nature of risks posed by cosmetic body
modification, the propensity of adolescents generally to engage in reckless
behavior, and the particular vulnerabilities of people who seek cosmetic body
60
modifications, suggest a need for limitations on their availability to adolescents.1
Second, decisions for medical and nonmedical cosmetic body modification
are more susceptible to peer influence than are other medical decisions.161 Most
medical decisions are made in the context of the confidential physician-patient

152. Scudder, supranote 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Sean T. Carroll et al., Tattoos and Body Piercingsas Indicators ofAdolescent Risk-Taking
Behaviors, 109 J. PEDIATRICS 1021, 1023, 1026-27 (2002) (discussing the link between participants
with tattoos and/or body piercings, and likelihood of engaging in risk-taking behavior and at a greater
degree than those without tattoos or piercings).
156. Kristen Nugent, Cosmetic Surgery on Patientswith Body Dysmorphic Disorder:Cutting the Tie
That Binds, 28 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 77, 80 (2009).
157. David B. Sarwer et al., Cosmetic Breast Augmentation and Suicide, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
1006, 1007 (2007).
158. See, e.g., Roberta J. Honigman et al., A Review of Psychosocial Outcomesfor PatientsSeeking
Cosmetic Surgery, 113 PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1229 (2004).
159. See Carroll et al., supra note 155, at 1021-24 (discussing how teenagers with tattoos and body
piercings are more likely to explore other risky activities); Joan-Caries Suris et al., PiercingAmong
Adolescents: Body Art as Risk Marker, 56 J. FAM. PRAC. 126, 126 (2007) ("Body piercing among young
people has been linked with risk behaviors such as the abuse of legal and illegal substances, risky sexual
behavior, school truancy and running away, suicide ideation and attempts, and delinquent behavior.").
160. Suris et al., supra note 159, at 126-27 (providing an overview of risky behavior linked to teens
with tattoos and body piercings).
161. Scudder, supranote 1.
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relationship.1 62 Shrouded in privacy, they are insulated from peer pressure.
Decisions by teens for cosmetic body modification are much more public. Teens
are bombarded with images of cosmetically enhanced models in the media.' 63 The
pressure to meet a culturally defined ideal of beauty is tremendous.IM Reports of
teens seeking cosmetic procedures to escape peer pressure are common.165 An
available study also suggests that peer influence is a significant motivating factor
for teens who seek cosmetic body modification.166 Even proponents of cosmetic
surgery for teenagers use escape from peer pressure as a good reason to choose
surgical modification.' 67
Third, the role of the medical professional differs with respect to cosmetic
body modification as compared to other medical interventions.' 68 In the healthcare
context generally, a physician limits options for invasive procedures to those that
are medically effective as measured by objective scientific criteria.169 This
professional guidance acts as safeguard against impulsive and reckless decision
making. Cosmetic surgery is by its very nature less concerned with medical
efficacy.170 Its goal is aesthetic and social improvement.' 7 ' The American Academy

162. See AMA COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS Op. 5.05
(last updated 2007), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/code-medical-ethics/505a.pdf
(discussing the duty confidentiality in the physician-patient relationship).
163. See Julie M. Albright, Impossible Bodies: TV Viewing Habits, Body Image, and Plastic Surgery
Attitudes Among College Students in Los Angeles and Bufjalo, New York, 15 CONFIGURATIONS 103, 103
(2007) (discussing how teens are affected by the messages regarding body image they view in the
media); Today: Why Teens Want to Have Plastic Surgery (NBC News television broadcast May 7, 2003)
(discussing the pressure of constantly seeing "perfect girls, perfect faces, [and] perfect bodies" in
magazines and on TV).
164. Pressure
to
be
Perfect,
BBC
NEwS
(OCT.
7,
1998,
1:14
GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/187703.stm (describing common pressures and negative thoughts
woman experience in trying to meet society's ideal of beauty).
165. Mary Powers, Teens and Plastic Surgery: Maybe Not the Greatest Idea in the World, Vero
BEACH J., Sept. 19, 2000, at Cl (noting how the media and peer pressure are influencing a new
generation of patients interested in plastic surgery); Today: Today's Health (NBC News television
broadcast June 25, 2009) (describing how young girls seek cosmetic surgery to "fit in"); see also Today:
Why Teens Want to Have Plastic Surgery, supra note 163.
166. See, e.g., James A. Farrow et al., Tattooing Behavior in Adolescence: A Comparison Study, 145
AM. J. DISEASES CHILD. 184 (1991) (characterizing motivations for tattooing in adolescents, including
low self-esteem and peer pressure). Concededly, the available data is sparce. Given the popularity of
cosmetic procedures for adolescents, further research is warranted to determine the culture, emotional,
and economic factors behind the increase.
167. See, e.g., LUKASH, supra note 4, at 11-12, 27 (describing the anguish caused by youth bullying
over appearances and opining that plastic surgery is a good option to help alleviate such issues).
168. See, e.g., Marc G. Simon, The Physician 's Duty to Screen Patients for Elective Surgery, 20
ARiz. L. REv. 669, 671 (1978) (exploring the unique duties owed to patients requesting plastic surgery).
169. See generally David L. Sackett et al., Evidence Based Medicine: What it Is And What it Isn t,
312 J. BRIT. MED. ASS'N 71 (1996) (explaining the process of evidence-based practice, by which
physicians use objective scientific criteria to make judgments about a patient's care).
170. See Zuckerman & Abraham, supra note 40, at 3 (stating that cosmetic surgery is mainly
concerned with changing a person's body image). But see AM. BD. OF PLASTIC SURGERY,
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of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery code of ethics says only "[a] member
must not perform a surgical operation that is not calculated to improve or benefit
the patient." 72 The degree to which cosmetic or social interventions benefit a
patient is a subjective measure.' 73 Few studies have examined even the frequent
claims that cosmetic surgery provides psychological benefit.174 No study has shown
any long-term benefit of plastic surgery on adolescents.1 75 In fact, no conclusive
studies indicate "cosmetic surgery improves overall body image or quality of life
for adolescents or adults." 76 Without an evidence base to guide them, cosmetic
surgeons are left to their own subjective judgments about what procedures make
sense for a given patient. And if media reports are to be believed, some cosmetic
surgeons have exercised questionable judgment when deciding to acquiesce to a
request for cosmetic procedures.' 77 For this reason, there is simply no guarantee
that a professional adult decision maker committed to the preserving the health of
the adolescent can be counted on to counter impulsive risk taking by adolescents
for body modification.
In sum, voluntary risk taking, the influence of peer pressure, and the
possibility for impulsive decision making are very much at play when it comes to
cosmetic body modification.' 78 Developmental science tells us that risk taking,
impulsiveness, and responding to peer pressure are cognitive capacities not yet
developed in adolescent brains.179 For that reason, the presumption of incapacity
now applicable at law makes sense.' 80 Efforts to expand the authority of

https://www.abplsurg.org/moddefault.aspx (last visited Jan. 28, 2012) (noting the mission statement of
the American Board of Plastic Surgery includes the performance of effective, safe and ethical surgeries).
171. See Zuckerman & Abraham, supranote 40, at 3; LUKASH, supra note 4, at I1-12, 27.
172. AM. ACAD. OF FACIAL PLASTIC & RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY, CODE OF ETHICS 8 (2000).
173. Neil S. Sadick, Commentary, The Impact of Cosmetic Interventions on Quality of Life,
(Aug.
2008),
ONLINE
J.
DERMATOLOGY
http://dermatology.cdlib.org/148/commentary/qualityoflife/sadick.html ("Beauty itself is entirely
subjective, and the technical aspects of aesthetic procedures may not result in patient satisfaction.").
174. Zuckerman & Abraham, supra note 40, at 320-21 (opining that few studies have been
conducted focusing on psychological benefit of cosmetic surgery and that none have focused on the
long-term results of cosmetic surgery in adolescents).
175. Id. at 321.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Allison Adato, Too Young for Lipo?, PEOPLE, Nov. 13, 2006, at 131,
http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20059928,00.html (describing a case in which a plastic
surgeon performed liposuction on a twelve-year-old girl). It is possible that such a case is aberrational.
The data collected about the use of cosmetic surgeries is far too vague to determine how many extreme
or ethically suspect procedures are performed on a regular basis.
178. Scudder, supranote 1.
179. Arshagouni, supra note 10, at 347-52 (describing research on adolescent brain and cognitive
development).
180. See Melinda G. Schmidt & N. Dickon Reppucci, Children s Rights and Capacities, in
CHILDREN, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE LAW 76, 82 (Bette L. Bottoms et al. eds., 2002) (recognizing that
under the law minors cannot make informed medical decisions because of their presumed immaturity);
NANCY E. WALKER ET AL., CHILDREN'S RIGHTS INTHE UNITED STATES: IN SEARCH OF A NATIONAL
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adolescents with respect to their own bodies and health should not extend to
cosmetic body modification. As the Supreme Court recognized in Roper, where
adolescent decision making is compromised, protections may be in order.18 The
following section discusses the efficacy of parental consent laws as a protection
mechanism.
VI. ROLE OF THE PARENT: SHOULD PARENTS HAVE DECISION-MAKING POWER?

Because adolescents should not be given unchecked decisional authority to
engage in body modification, it makes sense to turn to parents to protect
adolescents from impulsivity, recklessness, and submission to peer pressure.182
Assuming adolescents should have access to cosmetic body modification, parental
consent rules make sense where the adolescent initiated the request for
intervention.1 3 The parent, after all, can generally be trusted to protect a child's
best interests.1 84 However, parents should not be given sole authority to approve or
disapprove of modifications to their children's bodies.185
Consider two scenarios. In the first, a parent brings a shy withdrawn sixteenyear-old girl named Lisa to schedule a nose job. Noticing that Lisa has a large nose
with a slight bump, the surgeon asks the teen if she wants the surgery. Staring at the
floor, Lisa says "it's fine." The mother stares hard at the daughter and reminds her
"we agreed to this." To the surgeon, the parent says, "let's schedule this."
In the second, sixteen-year-old Fred has worked closely with a pediatrician
and a nutritionist to lose weight over a two-year period. Although his family has
not been particularly supportive, his efforts have been remarkably successful. With
a complete commitment to a healthy diet and exercise, he has lost over 100 pounds.
Unfortunately, he has fair skin, which did not shrink to fit his newly fit frame. The

POLICY 142 (1999) (adding that states can limit a minor's ability to make legal decisions because minors
generally lack experience and maturity).
181. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005) (holding that minors have a different standard for
decision making than adults because "[t]heir own vulnerability and comparative lack of control over
their immediate surroundings mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing
to escape negative influences in their whole environment").
182. See, e.g., AM. SOC'Y OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, POLICY STATEMENT: BREAST AUGMENTATION IN

TEENAGERS 1 (2004) (recognizing that because teenagers may be motivated to engage in plastic surgery
by a desire to "fit in," it is important to involve parents in the decision-making process). Although it is
important to include parents, they may sometimes be the people pressuring the adolescents to obtain the
surgery. Id.
183. See, e.g., Andy Piker, Balancing Liberation and Protection: A Moderate Approach to
Adolescent Health Care Decision-Making,25 BIOETHICS 202, 205 (2011) (suggesting that research has
shown that adults are often better able to assess an adolescent's best interests and preventing adolescents
from making their own healthcare decisions may not be discriminatory since such policies are grounded
in the belief that adolescents and adults do not share the same decision-making capacities).
184. See Wanda K. Mohr & Sheila Suess Kennedy, The Conundrum of Children in the US Health
Care System, 8 NURSING ETHICS 196, 199 (2001).
185. See Piker, supra note 183, at 205-06 (advocating for an intermediate level of involvement from
parents in the healthcare decision-making process for adolescent patients).
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weight loss has left him with a great deal of excessive drooping skin (a pannus) at
the bottom of his belly and large breasts (gynecomastia) that droop significantly.
The large breasts and drooping skin dismay Fred. He wants more than anything to
be able to wear a tee shirt without shame, but he continues to hide his body because
he feels it is deformed. He would join the school's swim team but for his extra skin.
Fred has asked his pediatrician to refer him to a cosmetic surgeon for breast
reduction and skin removal. Fred has researched the procedures and is remarkably
knowledgeable about all they involve. He has even found a local plastic surgeon
that performs post-weight loss surgeries for teenagers without cost. Worried that
Fred's distress over his extra skin and large breasts will discourage further weight
loss or continued healthy living, the pediatrician makes the referral. Fred's parents,
however, refuse to allow Fred to be seen by the surgeon, and they adamantly refuse
to consider plastic surgery for their son.
Under the law, Lisa's mother can give effective consent to the surgery, and
Fred's parents can veto even the consultation.' 86 Both results are problematic. In
the first scenario, the parent may well be acting in what she believes to be Lisa's
best interest, but her consent is not enough to justify operating on Lisa, given her
ambivalence about the procedure.' 87 In reality, few surgeons would agree to operate
on Lisa give her reluctance.' 88 Forcing a reluctant teen to undergo cosmetic surgery
is ethically and practically problematic. As a rights-bearing individual who will
have to live through and with the surgery, Lisa should have some voice in the
decision.' 89 In fact, the American Society for Plastic Surgeons urges its members to
evaluate the teen for maturity and commitment to the procedure.190 The ASPS
plastic Surgery for Teenagers Briefing paper states:
The most rewarding outcomes are expected when the following exist:
The teenager initiates the request. While parental support is essential,
the teenager's own desire for plastic surgery must be clearly expressed
and repeated over a period of time. The teenager has realistic goals.
The young person must appreciate both the benefits and limitations of
plastic surgery, avoiding unrealistic expectations about life changes
that will occur as a result of the procedure. The teenager has sufficient
maturity. Teenagers must be able to tolerate the discomfort and

186. See Schmidt & Reppucci, supra note 180, at 82 (stating that parents have the legal right to
make medical decisions on behalf of their children); see also WALKER ET AL., supra note 180, at 142.
187. See, e.g., Mary Ann McCabe, Involving Children and Adolescents in Medical Decision Making:
Developmental and Clinical Considerations, 21 J. OF PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 505, 506 (1996) (stipulating
the legal requirement that medical decisions be free from coercion should also apply to children).
188. See Douglas J. Opel & Benjamin S. Wilfond, Cosmetic Surgery in Children with Cognitive
Disabilities: Who Benefits? Who Decides?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan-Feb. 2009, at 19, 19
(describing the preference of cosmetic physicians to postpone "risky" surgery until children are
competent to be included in the decision-making process).
189. Id.
190. Plastic Surgery for Teenagers, supra note 5.

154

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW

& POLICY

[VOL. 15:129

temporary disfigurement of a surgical procedure. Plastic surgery is not
recommended for teens who are prone to mood swings or erratic
behavior, who are abusing drugs and/or alcohol, or who are being
treated for clinical depression or other mental illness. 191
The recommendations are aspirational only, however, and if stories in the
media can be believed, some surgeons appear willing to comply with parents'
requests to "fix" a child's face or body to the parents' liking.192 Whether by force or
through professional discipline, some limits on parental choice are necessary. 193
The parent does not own the child's body.194 The parent cannot modify it at will.1 95
Parental authority comes from a place of trust, wherein the parent is empowered to
make medical decisions to promote the child's health and well-being.196 That
authority does not give parents rights to subjugate the child's body to meet the
parent's aesthetic wishes. Thus, a provider faced with an aggressive parent can and
should decline to participate in cosmetic modification of an adolescent's body.
Likewise, in some rare cases, some mechanism should be available to allow a
minor to override a parental veto of a cosmetic modification. The second scenario
might present one such case. For Fred, the sought-after modifications may be as
important to his physical health as any other health related intervention. Freed of
his large breasts and extra skin, Fred will continue his exercise program by joining
a swim team. He has met all the criteria set forth by the ASPS, except that he lacks
parental support. The legal roadblock he faces in getting the desired treatment is
significant. Unless he becomes medically emancipated or he lives in a state that
recognizes the mature minor doctrine,197 he is likely to be stymied until he reaches
the age of maturity regardless of the distress and frustration he feels about his body.
In such cases, where a mature minor has made a persistent and informed decision
for treatment, and a provider agrees that immediate treatment is necessary to
prevent long term psychological or physical harm, the lack of parental consent
should not be an absolute roadblock to treatment.19

191. Id
192. See Adato, supranote 177, at 131; see supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
193. See Piker, supra note 183, at 206.
194. See United States v. King, 840 F.2d 1276, 1283 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Our law views the child as an
individual with the dignity and humanity of other individuals, not as property."); see also Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (finding liberty in the fourteenth amendment implies
"freedom of choice in the basic decisions of one's life respecting ... [the] upbringing of children").
195. See Bolton, U.S. 410 at 211 (stipulating that the upbringing of children is subject to some
control by the state).
196. Mohr & Kennedy, supra note 184, at 199. For more on this argument, see Ouellette, supranote
9, at 997-98.
197. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7002 (West 2004) (describing the requirements for a person under
eighteen to be emancipated); Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & Sch. of Nursing, Inc., 469 P.2d 330, 337
(Kan. 1970) (adopting the mature minor doctrine in Kansas).
198. See Beb & Diamond, supra note 18, at 239-41 (describing a case in which a court overruled a
parental veto of gender hormones for a teenage male because failure to do so would harm the minor).
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Thus, parents should have limited authority to consent to or deny body
modification interventions for youth where such modifications are made available
at all during adolescence.199 Generally, parental consent laws ensure against
immature, impulsive, or ill-considered decisions for risky interventions by
adolescents. 200 Parental consent should be only part of the equation, however. 201 No
adolescent should be forced into body modification. Her repeated and informed
desire for the procedure is critical if she is to be respected as full human being. And
in some cases, the lack of parental consent should not prevent an adolescent from
obtaining cosmetic body modification. When the adolescent has made a persistent,
unambiguous, and informed choice, and, medical professionals agree with a
determined adolescent that body modification is urgent to prevent psychological or
other harm, some mechanism should be available to allow the adolescent to
override a parental veto.
VII. FINAL THOUGHTS

If we as a society are concerned about body modification by adolescents, we
should proceed with caution. Some procedures may be so risky, or so unnecessary
as to justify outright bans, such as those that exist against body piercing and
tattooing of minors in certain states. 202 An argument could be made, for example,
that cosmetic breast augmentation should be banned for persons under the age of
twenty-one, because the risks of the procedure are so great, 203 the fact that the
breasts have may not be fully developed until the late teens or early twenties, 204 and
the link that exists between breast augmentation and suicide. 205 Bans take the
decisions for risky behavior out of the hands of parents and adolescents. They take
away choices that could be harmful and save them for adulthood-much like age
limits on drinking alcohol, marriage, entering combat. Bans make sense as a means
of protecting adolescents from unnecessary risk. The difficulty with bans is that
they may paint with too broad a brush. For example, cosmetic surgeons appear to
agree that breast augmentation is appropriate in adolescents for reconstructive

199. See Piker, supra note 183, at 206.
200. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979) (finding that because most children cannot
make sound judgments on certain issues, parents have the ability and responsibility to make judgments
for their children on those issues).
201. See Piker, supra note 183, at 206.
202. See supra note 49 for examples of states that ban tattoos regardless of parental consent.
203. Risks
of
Breast
Implants,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/Breastimpl
ants/ucm064106.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
204. See
Normal
Breast
Development,
WEILL
CORNELL
PHYSICIANS,
http://www.weillcomell.org/health/normal-breast-development.html (last visited March 4, 2012) (noting
that breast development may continue into the early twenties); AM. SOC'Y OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, supra
note 182, at I (noting FDA concerns that a women's breast may not be fully developed at age eighteen).
205. See Sarwer et al., supra note 157, at 1007.
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purposes; that is "to correct asymmetry caused by congenital errors, trauma or
disease." 206 A broad ban might fail to make such a distinction, or discourage
providers from acting in borderline cases.
In any case, this essay is more concerned with procedures that are legally
available for teens. Where evidence suggests that cosmetic interventions may
indeed serve the best interest of an adolescent, they should be available. 207
However, developmental science teaches that adolescents are not sufficiently
mature to be vested with unchecked authority over body modification
interventions. 208 Parental involvement generally, and parental consent laws
specifically, serve an important protective role with respect to cosmetic body
modification. They are not enough, however. The professional hired to perform the
modification should play a critical role in respecting the person of the adolescent,
her autonomous choices, and her rights to self determination and bodily integrity.

206. AM. SOC'Y OF PLASTIC SURGEONS, supra note 182, at 1.

207. See, e.g., Beh & Diamond, supra note 18, at 220-21 (explaining the 2004 case of a thirteenyear-old female named Alex, whose decision to undergo sexual reassignment surgery after being
diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder was upheld, despite significant controversy).
208. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (referring to developmental science
documenting that that adolescents are developmentally different from adults).

